Mandatory Pro Bono: The Path to Equal Justice by deSteiguer, John R.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 2 Article 5
1-15-1989
Mandatory Pro Bono: The Path to Equal Justice
John R. deSteiguer
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons,
Law and Society Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Organizations Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
John R. deSteiguer Mandatory Pro Bono: The Path to Equal Justice, 16 Pepp. L. Rev. 2 (1989)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol16/iss2/5
Mandatory Pro Bono: The Path to Equal Justice
I. INTRODUCTION
If ever a time shall come when . . . only the rich man can enjoy law as a
doubtful luxury, when the poor who need it most cannot have it, when only a
golden key will unlock the door to the courtroom, the seeds of revolution will
be sown, the firebrand of revolution will be lighted and put into the hands of
men, and they will almost be justified in the revolution which will follow. 1
"If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one command-
ment: Thou shalt not ration justice."2 Throughout history, many at-
tempts have been made to satisfy the legal needs of the poor. In
1495, England enacted a law during the reign of King Henry VII that
provided for counsel to be given to poor litigants at no cost. 3 Since
this early beginning, no less than fifteen western, industrialized na-
tions have provided such a right to counsel to indigents.4 The experi-
ence of the United States, however, is significantly different.
Although indigent defendants in criminal cases have a constitutional
right to counsel,5 this right has not been equally extended to indigent
civil litigants.6 Additionally, although federal law provides for the
waiver of fees, costs, and security deposits in criminal and civil cases
for persons financially unable to pay,7 legal opinion is less than unan-
1. E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES xiii (1951) (quoting Lyman
Abbot, New York Legal Aid Society 25th Anniversary Dinner (1901)).
2. BROWNELL, supra note 1, at xviii (quoting the Honorable Judge Learned Hand,
New York Legal Aid Society 75th Anniversary Dinner (1951)).
3. Johnson, The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An International Perspective, 19
LoY. L.A.L. REV. 341, 342 (1985) (citing Statute of Henry VII, 1495, 11 Hen. 7, ch. 7
(repealed 1883, 46 & 47 Vict. ch. 49), reprinted in S. POLLOCK, LEGAL AID-THE FIRST
25 YEARS 10 (1975)).
And after the said writ or writs be returned,.., the justices.., shall assign to
the same poor person or persons counsel learned by their discretions which
shall give their counsels nothing taking for the same, and in likewise the same
justices shall appoint an attorney and attorneys for the same poor person and
persons... which shall do their duties without any rewards.
Id. (translated from the King's English into modern language).
4. These nations include the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Johnson, supra note 3, at 343-48 nn.8-32.
5. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (indigent criminal defendants
have a constitutional right to appointed counsel for all felonies, all misdemeanors for
which imprisonment is actually imposed, and all appeals of right).
6. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Sholter v. Claudy, 203 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1953)
(constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel applies only in criminal proceedings).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982). "Any court of the United States may authorize the
imous as to whether federal judges may compel or merely request at-
torneys to volunteer their services to the indigent.8
The result of these attempts to provide legal services to the poor in
the United States has been a kaleidoscope, with contributions being
made by legal aid societies,9 federal1 0 and state1 governmental pro-
grams, and individual and collective efforts of the private bar.12 Few
dispute, however, that despite these efforts, this country's poor are
under-represented.13
The purpose of this comment is to delineate the role that attorneys
can and should take and the impact they would have on the problem
of inadequate legal representation of the poor. Initially, this com-
ment will quantify the unfulfilled need for civil counsel that exists
for indigents in this country. The next part will describe the present
state of legal assistance to the poor, focusing on the pro bono efforts
being made by the bar. Also provided will be an analysis of the argu-
ments concerning the constitutional and practical problems com-
commencement ... of any ... action ... civil or criminal ... without prepayment of
fees and costs or security... by a person... unable to pay such costs or give security
therefor." Id.
8. Id. § 1915(d). "The court may request an attorney to represent any such per-
son unable to employ counsel .... Id. Some federal district courts have compelled
such service from attorneys. See infra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
9. The first legal aid society in the United States began in 1876. The Deutscher
Rechts-Schutz Verein was incorporated to give free legal aid and assistance to poor
German immigrants. BROWNELL, supra note 1, at 7. By 1916, organized legal aid oper-
ated in 37 cities, and the programs handled 117,201 cases. Id. at 8. For further history
of legal aid in the United States, see generally J. BRADWAY & R. SMITH, GROWTH OF
LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES (U.S. Department of Labor Bulletin No. 607
(1936); R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR, (1919); Special Project, The Legal Services
Corporation: Past, Present, and Future? 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 593 (1983) [hereinafter
Special Project].
10. On the federal level, the Federal Legal Services Program was established in
1965 under the Office of Economic Opportunity. Special Project, supra note 9, at 598.
The Legal Services Program was replaced with an independent corporation, the Legal
Services Corporation, "in order to protect the effectiveness, independence, and integ-
rity of federally funded legal services for the poor." Id. at 603. Among the congres-
sional findings in establishing the Legal Services Corporation were: (1) the "need to
provide equal access to the system of justice"; (2) the "need to provide high quality
legal assistance to those" unable to afford it and; (3) the goodwill generated in society
to respect the government and its laws by making legal services available. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996 (1982). The purpose of the Legal Service Corporation was to provide "financial
support for legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons finan-
cially unable to afford legal assistance." Id. § 2996b(a).
11. Several states have also created publicly-funded legal service programs. See
generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 45A (1987). Maryland created the Maryland Legal
Services Corporation in 1982 to supplement legal services for the poor. Id.
12. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Spencer, Mandatory Public Service for Attorneys: A Proposal for the
Future, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 493 (1981) (asserting that a mandatory service requirement of
attorneys is constitutionally and ethically proper and represents progress toward a just
distribution of legal services). "[T]he present need for legal services among un-repre-
sented and under-represented individuals and groups is enormous." Id. at 495.
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monly associated with mandatory pro bono. In response to
arguments of impracticability, this comment will suggest proposals
that would make a compulsory pro bono program more palatable to
attorneys and more beneficial to indigents. Finally, this comment
concludes that although mandatory pro bono is a constitutionally
valid approach to solving the serious problem of the poor's under-rep-
resentation, alterations of past proposals are needed to marshal the
support of the bar and to provide truly effective assistance to the
poor.
II. THE NEED
Few people would question that the legal needs of this country's
poor14 and near poor15 are substantial. A more difficult question, on
which there is no consensus, is the extent of unfulfilled need.' 6 A re-
cent estimate suggests that over eighteen million legal problems, or
ninety-three percent of the annual legal needs of the poor, go
unserved.17
The existence of this unmet need is verified by numerous studies
conducted on the state level. In Maryland, a study conducted in July
1987 indicated that "the typical low-income household surveyed had
3.29 legal problems per year (excluding repeat occurrences of identi-
cal problems)"; two-thirds of the households questioned reported
having at least one problem in the previous twelve months.18 Despite
14. The classification of the poor is determined by the government's poverty in-
come level. In 1985, poverty level income was $10,989 or less. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE
1987 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 442, table no. 745 [hereinafter STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT].
15. The near poor is commonly defined as persons whose income is not more than
125% of poverty level income (that is 1.25 times the current poverty income level).
One hundred and twenty-five percent of the poverty level income in 1985 was $13,736.
Id. This latter category was composed of 44.2 million persons, 18.7% of the United
States population. Id.
16. Miskiewicz, Mandatory Pro Bono Won't Disappear, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 23, 1987, at
8, col. 3 (statements by Mr. Gerry Singsen, lecturer at Harvard Law School and former
vice-president of the Legal Services Corporation) ("Nobody has a truly comprehensive
picture of the legal needs of the poor.").
17. Born, Serving the Poor, 74 A.B.A. J. 144 (1988). Of the estimated 19,794,000
legal needs of the poor, 93.2% go unserved, while 6.1% or 1,197,668 are handled by
Legal Service Corporation attorneys, and only 0.7%, or 141,667 are disposed of through
private bar involvement. Id.
18. MARYLAND LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, ACTION PLAN FOR LEGAL SERVICES
TO MARYLAND'S POOR 9 (1987). The low-income household survey was conducted by
Mason-Dixon Opinion Research, Inc. which contacted 800 randomly selected house-
holds. Id. at 8. "[A] legal problem was defined as a situation which, if brought to the
attention of an attorney experienced in providing legal assistance to low-income per-
the extent of the problems, only thirty-seven percent of the house-
holds had seen an attorney in the previous five years.19 Analysts es-
timate that only one out of every five poor persons with a legal
problem in Maryland receives proper assistance. 20
In Washington State, a State Bar Association study initiated in 1985
concluded: "the volume of free legal services now available to low-in-
come people who cannot otherwise afford a lawyer is grossly inade-
quate and ... the situation is getting worse." 21 The study found that
legal services programs in the state were funded at rates less than
one-half the amount necessary to provide the minimum access to
legal services for the poor as determined by Congress.22
In 1985, the Oregon State Bar Association similarly concluded, that
a substantial unmet need existed.23 This study indicated that, annu-
ally, between 89,000 and 106,000 "potential meritorious 'cases'" ex-
isted for the Oregon poor. 24 The legal services programs in Oregon
could handle only one-third of these cases. 25 Only ten percent of the
remaining 60,000 cases were accepted by voluntary pro bono
programs. 26
Clearly the poor in this country are neither insulated nor immune
from legal difficulties. Although the exact quantification of the legal
needs of the poor is not clear, it is obvious that they are vast. Cer-
tainly, the unmet needs are substantial enough to warrant assistance
in some form.
III. THE PRESENT STATE OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO THE POOR
Efforts to lessen the unmet legal needs of the poor by direct assist-
ance of legal professionals are packaged in three modes. First, direct
government programs established on the federal27 and state28 levels
exist to bring legal aid to the indigent. But such programs are not
necessarily assured of permanency. For instance, the vitality and ef-
fectiveness of the Legal Services Corporation, the mainstay in feder-
sons, would be recognized as constituting a problem within the provisions of the law."
Id. at 8-9.
19. Id. (emphasis in original).
20. Wentzel, Bringing Legal Aid to State's Poor, The Evening Sun (Baltimore),
Oct. 2, 1987, at 4, col. 2.
21. DRAFT REPORT OF THE WASHINGTON STATE 3AR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON
PRO BONO SERVICES 9 (1987) [hereinafter WASHINGTON DRAFT REPORT].
22. Id. at 9-10. Congress mandated that legal services programs should be funded
at a level of $13.57 per poor person to provide minimum access to legal services. Id. at
9.
23. Id. at 10.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 10-11.
27. See supra note 10.
28. See supra note 11.
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ally-funded legal aid to the poor, has been questioned due to actions
and philosophies inside2 9 and outside3O the halls of government.
Even assuming the continued existence of the Legal Services Corpo-
ration, its resource base is microscopic when compared to the amount
spent on access to legal assistance by society as a whole.31 In 1985,
$47.5 billion was spent for legal services in the United States.3 2 The
Legal Services Corporation budget for 1985 was only $305 million.33
Thus, the federal government's expenditure for legal aid to almost
one-fifth of the population34 was only two-thirds of one percent of
the national expenditure on the services of lawyers in civil cases.
A second method of assistance to the poor are programs operated
by legal aid societies. Although these efforts are often highly suc-
29. The Reagan Administration consistently sQught to terminate the Legal Serv-
ices Corporation (LSC). See Caplan, Understanding the Controversy Over the Legal
Services Corporation, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 583 (1984). Despite annual budget re-
quests that included no funds for the operation of LSC, Congress has continued to allo-
cate money to the Corporation, albeit at amounts less than pre-1980 figures. Id. at 583-
84. In 1980, the LSC budget was $321 million. Id. at 584. In 1981, a 25% reduction
shrank the LSC budget to $241 million. Id. For the years 1984-1986, the LSC's budget
was frozen at $305.5 million. Miskiewicz, supra note 14. Additionally, an automatic
cut of over $14 million was made in the 1986 budget due to the Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings Budget Reduction Act. Id.
See also Lauter, LSC Head Suggests Abolishing Agency, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 23, 1987, at 2,
col. 1. The current director of the LSC is Mr. W. Clark Durant III, a Reagan ap-
pointee. Mr. Durant supported the Reagan Administration's desire to abolish the legal
aid corporation. Mr. Durant advocates the opening up of the legal profession by re-
pealing state laws prohibiting unauthorized legal practice and by eliminating bar exam
passage requirements. He suggests that by allowing nonlawyers to provide legal serv-
ices, new and more effective ways of serving the poor could be developed. Id.
30. See, e.g., Phillips, Legal Services and the Public Interest, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 355 (1985) (address given by the President of the Conservative Caucus at the
1984 Federalist Society National meeting advocating the termination of the LSC charg-
ing that its attorneys have been free to "lobby, litigate, organize, propagandize, patron-
ize, and proselytize for their preferred causes" in violation of Congress's intent and
directions). Id. at 355; see also Comment, Pulling the Reins on Legal Services Lobby-
ing, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203 (1986) (criticizing the LSC's lobbying activities and
suggesting Congress should tighten restrictions on the LSC to prevent abuse and to
provide control by the low-income legal services client in the attorney-client
relationship).
31. Johnson, supra note 3, at 357. Johnson concludes that government funding of
legal services for the poor is less than one percent of that spent by society for lawyers
in civil cases. Id.
32. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 14, at 754, table no. 1757.
33. Johnson, supra note 3, at 357 n.68.
34. Assistance from the Legal Services Corporation is available only to people fi-
nancially unable to obtain legal assistance on their own. 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (1982).
In 1985, 44.2 million persons, or 18.7% of the United States' population, had incomes at
the poor or near poor level. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 14, at 442, table no.
745.
cessful,3 5 they are overwhelmed by the vast needs of the underprivi-
leged, which exist despite government action.3 6
The third type of legal aid to the indigent, pro bono activities con
ducted by individual attorneys and bar associations, have yet to gar-
ner more than token participation.3 7 However, pro bono activity is
the area where the greatest potential lies to make significant inroads
in meeting the needs of the poor.3 8
Nationwide, the collective effort to mobilize the private bar to pro-
vide pro bono legal aid to the poor, although growing, is dismal.a9
Less than one in seven attorneys participate in a formal pro bono
program. 40 Despite these low figures, or maybe because of them, in-
terest is accelerating nationwide to require mandatory participation
by licensed attorneys in programs for the public service.4 1 This inter-
est has been manifested in judicial, legislative, and state and local bar
association initiatives.42
35. E.g., Krause, President's Page: The Legal Aid Foundation-Making the Rule of
Law a Reality for Low-Income People, 9 L.A. LAW. 6 (1986). The Legal Aid Founda-
tion of Los Angeles has a staff of 160 including 55 attorneys. Each year, the Founda-
tion assists 24,000 clients, out of a pool of 800,000 potential clients, on a budget of $6.4
million. The Foundation's effectiveness is exemplified by its 82% success rate in evic-
tion cases that go to trial. Id. at 7.
36. See Dale, Reagan Campaign Has Cut Legal Aid to Nation's Poor, Nat'l Cath.
Rep., May 15, 1987, at 8. Nationwide, there are 22 attorneys per 10,000 people in the
general population. Among the poor, the figure is 1.4 attorneys per 10,000. Id. In 1987,
the San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Program fulfilled less than 10% of
San Francisco's poor's legal needs, down from approximately 25% in 1981. Kenkelen,
Bay Area Public-lawyer Role is Down: Caseload is Not, Nat'l Cath. Rep., May 15, 1987,
at 8.
37. See infra notes 39 and 40 and accompanying text.
38. Palmer & Aaronson, Placing Pro Bono Publico in the National Legal Services
Strategy, 66 A.B.A. J. 851 (1980).
Pro bono service is the most crucial untapped resource realistically available
to the national legal services effort. If operated in close conjunction with full-
time, staffed programs and with an explicit set of priorities, organized pro
bono programs can substantially supplement both policy impact and individual
service work on behalf of the poor.
Id. at 854.
39. ABA CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC THROUGH THE PRI-
VATE BAR INVOLVEMENT PROJECT, DIRECTORY OF PRIVATE BAR INVOLVEMENT PRO-
GRAMS 212, table no. 5 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 ABA DIRECTORY]. Only 13.8% of the
licensed attorneys in the United States participate in formal pro bono programs. This,
however, is up from 10.7% in 1985. Id. at 199, table no. 7. But see, Harkness, Executive
Directions-Pro Bono in Florida: Contributions from Private Practitioners, 59 FLA.
B.J. 7 (1985). In 1984, a random sampling of 5000 attorneys practicing in Florida indi-
cated that 72.1% of the in-state and almost 60% of the out-of-state bar members
donated time to pro bono. Id.
40. 1987 ABA DIRECTORY, supra note 39, at 213, table no. 5.
41. See Graham, Mandatory Pro Bono-The Shape of Things to Come?, 73 A.B.A.
J. 62 (1987); see also Pro Bono Makes the Grade at Tulane, 16 STUDENT LAW. 7 (1988).
Beginning with the 1987-1988 first-year class, Tulane Law School requires students to
complete 20 hours of legal service for indigents through the New Orleans Pro Bono
Project in order to graduate.
42. Graham, supra note 41, at 62.
[Vol. 16: 355, 1989] Mandatory Pro Bono
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
A. Court Ordered Pro Bono
Recently, eight federal district courts have adopted local rules or
general orders that provide for the mandatory appointment of free
counsel to indigents in civil cases.43 On May 5, 1987, the district
courts sitting in Arkansas adopted Local Rule 34 which empowers
them to appoint legal counsel for indigents.44 The Arkansas plan
provides that, in civil cases in which a party is proceeding in forma
pauperis,45 the court may make a mandatory appointment of a prac-
ticing private attorney chosen at random from within the district in
which the case is pending.46 Safeguards are provided to ensure that
public service efforts will be spread evenly among the lawyer popula-
tion47 and that the cases referred are meritorious.48
A pro bono organization, the Volunteer Lawyers Project, coordi-
nates court appointments of attorneys to indigent clients made by the
United States Southern and Northern District Courts in Iowa.49 This
arrangement, initiated in 1986, locates attorneys to provide free rep-
resentation to indigent civil litigants.50 Recent federal court experi-
ence (excluding bankruptcy proceedings) is required of the
attorneys.51 In this program, like Arkansas', the attorney's burden in
serving is minimal.52
Other state courts have implemented programs by which private
43. Id. The eight federal courts are: "the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkan-
sas, Northern and Central Districts of Illinois, Northern and Southern Districts of
Iowa, the District of Connecticut, and the San Antonio division of Texas' Western Dis-
trict." Id.
44. ARK. FED. DIST. CT. R. 34 (1987).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
46. ARK. FED. DIST. CT. R. 34 (1987).
47. Upon written application filed within fifteen (15) days of the original ap-
pointment order, an attorney may request leave of the court to withdraw if
he/she represents (1) that he/she has actively participated in furnishing pro
bono legal services (e.g., membership in a pro bono legal organization); and (2)
that he/she has, in the last twelve (12) months, actually represented a pro
bono client(s) in either (a) litigation, or (b) a non-litigation matter which the
attorney can certify required the expenditure of a minimum of twenty (20)
hours of time.
Id. (emphasis in original).
48. Id. "If after interviewing the client, investigating the facts, and researching
the applicable law, an appointed attorney is convinced that the party's legal position is
non-meritorious, the appointed attorney may petition the Court for leave to with-
draw." Id.
49. St. Clair, Iowa VLP Coordinates Court Appointments and Pro Bono, P1 .I. Ac-
TIVATION EXCHANGE, Fall-Winter 1986, at 14.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The selection process involves a rotation of last names in three alphabeti-
attorneys are required to supply indigents with free legal assistance.
In Westchester County, New York, "Westchester Legal Services, Inc.,
in cooperation with the office of the Administrative Judge of the
Ninth Judicial District," assigns attorneys to represent civil litigants
in matrimonial actions.53 The assigned counsel program is.premised
on a statute which allows judges to assign attorneys to poor persons
in civil cases.5
In 1982, the ten district court judges of El Paso County, Texas, en-
tered an order requiring every active attorney in the county, who was
in good standing with the bar, to take no more than two domestic re-
lations cases annually.55 The program quickly established itself as a
success. During its first full year of operation, El Paso attorneys ac-
counted for almost thirty percent of all pro bono cases completed in
Texas.56 However, the status of this program is in doubt due to an
opinion issued by the Texas Attorney General which interpreted the
statute, on which the program was established, as not authorizing the
district judges to delegate to the local bar association the power to op-
erate a program that matched indigents with counsel in civil cases. 57
B. Legislative Consideration of Pro Bono Requirements
In 1987, two state legislatures studied the issue of requiring public
service of attorneys.5 8 In Oregon, the Speaker of the State House,
Vera Katz, authored a bill which would have required attorneys (and
doctors) with five or more years of experience to provide 200 hours of
professional services to indigents. 59 This bill was submitted to the
cal groups. Assignments are made from only one group a year; thus, attorneys are as-
signed once every third year. Id.
53. Fink, Why We Don't Have a Waiting List For Divorces, PRIVATE BAR AcTivi.
TIES REP., Dec. 1986 (bi-monthly publication of Committee on Legal Aid of the New
York State Bar Association). In the five-year period between January 1982 and De-
cember 1986, over 700 indigents were represented in matrimonial actions by pro bono
attorneys. Id.
54. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 1102(a) (McKinney 1976). "The court in its order per-
mitting a person to proceed as a poor person may assign an attorney." Id. Section
1102, in general, governs in forna pauperis rights and procedures in New York state
courts. Id.
55. Letter from W. Frank Newton to Royal Ferguson (Feb. 24, 1984) (enclosing
amicus brief submitted in support of the El Paso county pro bono program, at 8).
56. Id. (amicus brief, at 8, 9 n.14). Of the approximately 1,300 pro bono cases
closed in Texas in fiscal year 1983, 382 were completed by El Paso attorneys. Id.
57. See JM-161 Op. Att'y Gen. 707 (1984). The opinion found that Texas Civil Stat-
ute Annotated, article 1917, did "authorize a district court judge to appoint counsel in a
particular case when the party makes the required showing." Id. at 709. But this dis-
cretionary power rests with the court and could not be delegated in its administrative
operation, as here, to the local bar association. Id. at 710.
58. Graham, supra note 41, at 62.
59. H.B. 2005, 64th Oregon Leg., Reg. Sess. (1987). The bill required that attorneys
in Oregon serve 200 hours every six years in criminal defense, not civil cases. Id.
§ 2(2). To enforce this requirement, the bill gave the Oregon Supreme Court the
362
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Consumer and Business Affairs Committee,60 but failed to receive
the support necessary to go to the full house for consideration.61
During the summer of 1987, the Washington Senate Judiciary
Committee held public hearings on mandatory pro bono.62 Although
a specific proposal was not developed, the committee chairman, Sena-
tor Philip Talmadge, said the legislature was "interested in the issue"
and might reconsider mandatory pro bono if voluntary pro bono ac-
tivities in the state did not increase.6 3
C. Bar Association Consideration of Pro Bono Requirements
The American Bar Association (ABA) is a strong and active advo-
cate of pro bono publico. It has assisted hundreds of local pro bono
programs in a plethora of ways,64 including providing on-site techni-
cal assistance, 65 creating and disseminating aids to assist in program
development,66 awarding grants for pro bono projects,6 7 and recogniz-
ing success and achievement in individual and group public service
power to disbar, suspend, or reprimand any attorney not providing the requisite legal
services. Id. § 4.
60. Moss, Mandatory Pro Bono?, 73 A.B.A. J. 26 (1987).
61. Graham, supra note 41, at 62.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Born, supra note 17, at 144. In 1981, the A.B.A.'s Private Bar Involvement
Project (PBIP) was established by the Consortium on Legal Services and the Public
with the purpose of promoting involvement by private attorneys in assisting the poor
with their legal needs. Id. The PBIP has supported almost 600 local pro bono pro-
grams. Id. In addition, the PBIP keeps the legal profession abreast of current pro
bono developments by both periodicals (a monthly newsletter, the Bulletin; a quar-
terly journal, the PBI Exchange) and the annual Directory of Private Bar Involvement
Programs, and by co-hosting an annual Pro Bono Conference with the standing com-
mittee on Lawyer's Public Service Responsibility. Id.
65. Id. The PBIP will arrange a free on-site visit to offer technical assistance to
any requesting pro bono program. Two hundred such visits have occurred, with
twenty-eight programs being serviced. in 1986-1987. Id.
66. In 1983, the ABA's Special Committee on Lawyers' Public Service Responsibil-
ity, in cooperation with the Private Bar Involvement Project, published "The Re-
source: A Pro Bono Manual." The manual was "designed to provide a comprehensive
introduction to . . . the creation and implementation of organized pro bono publico
legal services programs." ABA's SPECIAL COMM. ON LAWYER'S PUB. SERV. RESP., THE
RESOURCE: A PRO BONO MANUAL xi (E.F. Lardent ed. 1983). In addition, an informa-
tion packet on civil mandatory pro bono has been compiled by the PBIP and. can be
requested by writing the PBIP at: American Bar Association, Private Bar Involvement
Project, 750 N. Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, IL 60611.
67. See, e.g., What's Happening, ABA Awards Grants for Pro Bono Projects, 8 BAR
LEADER 10 (1983). In 1983, the PBIP awarded $88,000 to six local bar groups to help
fund pro bono efforts. Id.
efforts.68 The ABA has even considered the issue of making pro
bono mandatory.
In 1980, the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Stan-
dards (commonly known as the Kutak Commission, after Commis-
sion Chairman Robert Kutak) presented a draft Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to replace the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity.69 Model Rule 8-1 initially required each attorney to render free
public service annually. 70 The outcry of opposition was swift, intense,
and ultimately successful.7 1 As adopted in 1983, the Model Rules
merely state that attorneys should render pro bono service.72
Recently, state and local bar associations have gone on record in of-
ficial support of pro bono efforts.73 While emphasizing the obligation
attorneys have in supporting the poor, some quantify the commit-
68. See, e.g., News Update, ABA Honors Pro Bono Lawyers, 71 A.B.A. J. 129 (1985).
The pro bono publico awards were created in 1984 to recognize individual lawyers for
noteworthy contributions to the delivery of legal services to the poor. Id.
69. The Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards was created in 1977
to "thoroughly and systematically rethink not only the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility but also the entire range of issues in ethical lawyering." Kutak, Coming: The
New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J. 47 (1980).
70. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (First Discussion Draft
1980) [hereinafter MODEL RULES DRAFT], reprinted in Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro
Bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 255, 261 (1981).
A lawyer shall render unpaid public interest legal service. A lawyer may dis-
charge this responsibility by service in activities for improving the law, the
legal system, or the legal profession, or by providing professional services to
persons of limited means or to public service groups or organizations. A law-
yer shall make an annual report concerning such service to appropriate regu-
latory authority.
Id.
71. In June 1980, the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
deleted the reporting requirement of Rule 8.1. Slonim, Commission Votes Down Pro
Bono Reporting, 66 A.B.A. J. 951 (1980), In December 1980, the ABA Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards terminated the proposal requiring mandatory
public service of all bar members. Kutak Panel Report: No Mandatory Pro Bono, 67
A.B.A. J. 33 (1981).
72. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. Rule 6.1 provides:
Pro Bono Publico Services: A lawyer should render public interest legal ser-
vice. A lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing professional
services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited means or to public
service or charitable groups or organizations, by service in activities for im-
proving the law, the legal system or the legal profession, and by financial sup-
port for organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means.
73. In September 1987, the Boston Bar Association adopted a resolution which
urged attorneys to make, as an important priority, public interest legal services in one
of five areas. The five areas are: poverty law, civil rights law, public rights law, chari-
table organization representation, and administration of justice and law reform. Bos-
ton Bar Ass'n Res. on Public Interest Legal Service (Sept. 1987) [hereinafter Boston
Resolution].
On August 14, 1986, the Board of Managers of the Chicago Bar Association adopted a
resolution that caused the Association to commit "to expanding civil legal services for
low income persons in Chicago; . . .[to] adopt voluntary standards for its members to
perform pro bono service;... [and] to employ a staff person to coordinate the [Associa-
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ment reasonably necessary to fulfill that obligation.74
Beyond mere aspirational policy statements, a few bar associations
have made pro bono participation mandatory. All members of the
Orange County, Florida, Bar Association are required annually to
take two pro bono referral cases or contribute $250 to the associa-
tion's Legal Aid Society. 75 The option to "buy-out" of representation
is exercised by 450 attorneys (twenty-eight percent of the associa-
tion's membership), while 800 attorneys (fifty percent of the associa-
tion's membership) take cases. 76  Pro bono service is also a
requirement of membership in the Tallahassee, Florida, Bar Associa-
tion.77 In Tallahassee's program, an attorney can expect to be as-
signed an indigent civil case once every sixteen months.78 The
Dupage, Illinois, County Bar Association is a third local bar that re-
quires its members to provide legal services for the poor.79
IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF MANDATORY PRO BONO
Despite the growing nationwide interest in requiring attorneys to
serve the poor, opponents argue that mandatory pro bono is ill-con-
tion's] pro bono activities." Board of Mgrs. of Chicago Bar Ass'n Res. (Aug. 14, 1986)
[hereinafter Chicago Resolution].
On January 20, 1987, the Connecticut Bar Association resolved to "expand civil legal
services for low income persons;... encourage its members to perform pro bono serv-
ices; .. .establish as its goal for 1987 a 33 percent participation.. in ... [formal] pro
bono activities; ... [and] assign a staff person to coordinate the ... pro bono activities
." Connecticut Bar Ass'n Res. (Jan. 20, 1987) [hereinafter Connecticut Resolution].
74. See, e.g., Boston Resolution, supra note 73 ("a reasonable level of commitment
to [public interest legal service] is 35 hours per year at a minimum"); Chicago Resolu-
tion, supra note 73 (members' obligations satisfied by annual donation of 25 hours,
$365, or the amount equivalent to net income realized from 25 billable hours of legal
work); Connecticut Resolution, supra note 73 (members should do annual service to-
taling at least 25 hours).
75. Marin-Rosa & Stepter, Orange County-Mandatory Pro Bono in a Voluntary
Bar Association, 59 FLA. B.J. 21 (1985). Although members of the Orange County Bar
Association are required to participate or contribute to the Legal Aid Society,'member-
ship in the association is voluntary. Id. The services provided by the Society include
assistance with the common legal problems the poor experience such as those involv-
ing "consumer, landlord/tenant, administrative, family, juvenile and senior citizen situ-
ations." Id. at 22. Each year the Society makes 13,500 public contacts and represents
approximately 1,500 in litigation. Id.
76. ABA's Pro Bono Involvement Project Office memorandum of telephone inter-
view with Orange County Legal Aid Society Director, Catherine Tucker (Oct. 1987).
77. Memorandum regarding the Tallahassee, Florida Legal Aid Foundation, Inc.,
prepared by Director/Secretary, Jean H. Bittner (Apr. 30, 1986) [hereinafter Bittner
Memorandum].
78. Id.
79. Graham, supra note 41, at 62.
ceived for two general reasons. First, requiring attorneys against.
their will to represent clients is unconstitutional. Second, even if it
were constitutional, mandatory pro bono will not produce effective
representation for the poor.
A. The Constitutional Perspective
The issue of the constitutionality of mandatory pro bono has been
ably, and in the terms of one commentator "exhaustively,"8 0 debated
by legal writers.81 Thus, a brief summary of the issues and the op-
posing viewpoints will suffice. From the outset it is important to
note that the constitutional validity of a pro bono requirement will be
definitively decided only by courts examining actual controversies.8 2
To this point, no court has ruled favorably or unfavorably on an ex-
isting mandatory program of service employed and enforced by bar
associations.8 3
Opponents advance several theories on which mandatory pro bono
could be found unconstitutional. First, a service requirement im-
posed on lawyers has been asserted to violate the fifth and fourteenth
amendments'8 4 prohibition of the taking of private property for pub-
lic use without just compensation.8 5 The gist of this argument is that
the attorney's services in counseling and representing the indigent
client are protected private property; the mandatory appointment of
the attorney without his agreement is a taking for public use. If this
argument were successful, the member of the bar required to serve
80. Torres & Stansky, In Support of a Mandatory Public Service Obligation, 29
EMORY L.J. 997, 1016 (1980) (asserting that the lack of access of the poor to the justice
system is inimical to a rational system of law and that such a condition demands imme-
diate response by the legal profession, namely by adopting a mandatory public service
obligation).
81. See generally id; Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitu-
tional Perspectives, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 255 (1981) (positing that mandatory pro bono is
historically, traditionally, and constitutionally sound). But see Shapiro, The Enigma of
the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735 (1980) (arguing that the history of
public service requirements is ambiguous and concluding that due to constitutional,
economic, and policy objections, no such obligation should be imposed on attorneys);
Gilbert & Gorenfeld, The Constitution Should Protect Everyone-Even Lawyers, 12
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 75 (1984) (finding that a mandatory pro bono requirement violates
attorneys' constitutional right to equal protection).
82. Torres & Stansky, supra note 80, at 1021.
83. But see supra note 57 and accompanying text. The Texas Attorney General's
office issued a finding that the El Paso court-ordered service plan was not authorized
by the statute on which it was premised. The Attorney General did not consider the
constitutionality of the program. Id.
84. The fifth amendment provides: "[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V This limitation has
been extended to the states via the fourteenth amendment despite the absence of such
explicit "no taking without compensation" language. See Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
85. Shapiro, supra note 81, at 771.
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the indigent would be entitled to just compensation. This theory was
relied on by the appellee in United States v. Dillon,86 but was re-
jected by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.8 7 The greater weight
of authority is that "enforcement of an obligation already owed to the
public cannot constitute a taking for public use within the fifth
amendment's strictures."8 8 The courts have found that attorneys
owe an obligation to the public to serve indigents on court order
based on traditions of the legal profession in their capacity as "of-
ficers of the court."89 Thus, as in Dillon, the majority of jurisdictions
do not find the appointment of attorneys to represent indigent liti-
gants to be a taking requiring compensation.9 0
A second theory of unconstitutionality is that mandatory pro bono
would discriminate against attorneys as a group in violation of equal
protection.9 1 The basis of this argument is that equal protection re-
quires that groups be treated similarly. 92 Because mandatory pro
bono singles out attorneys as a class to aid the indigent, attorneys are
treated differently from other groups and thus equal protection is vi-
olated. However, this objection "is based largely on intuitive appeal;
[and] it has never been upheld or even seriously considered in any re-
86. 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). In Dillon, the
attorney petitioned for fees and expenses after court-appointed representation of an
indigent defendant in a proceeding to vacate a judgment of conviction. The court of
appeals reversed the district court's order directing payment, holding that the court
appointment did not constitute a taking of the attorney's services.
87. The court concluded the appointment of appellee to serve as counsel for the
indigent was not a "taking" and thus it found it unnecessary to decide whether the at-
torney's services constituted "property within the amendment's meaning. Id. at 636.
88. Rosenfeld, supra note 81, at 288; see also Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S.
578, 588 (1978). "(T]he Fifth Amendment does not require that the government pay for
the performance of a public duty it is already owed." Id.
89. Dillon, 346 F.2d at 634; see also Rosenfeld, supra, note 81, at 288; Comment,
Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompen-
sated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366 (1981) (arguing that English common
law shows a clear history of the tradition of members in the legal profession in their
capacity as "officers of the court" to represent poor persons without compensation on
court order). But cf. Martineau, The Attorney as an Officer of the Court: Time to Take
the Gown Off the Bar, 35 S.C.L. REV. 541, 571 (1984) (asserting "that the assumed his-
torical relationship between the 'officer of the court' title and judicial regulation of the
bar" is inaccurate, and the use of the title merely provides a label that is substituted
for analysis); Shapiro, supra note 81, at 753 (asserting that the "clear" history that
mandatory pro bono proponents rely on to show a firm tradition of uncompensated
legal services does not exist).
90. Torres & Stansky, supra note 80, at 1017 n.88.
91. Gilbert & Gorenfeld, supra note 81, at 84.
92. The fourteenth amendment provides: "No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
ported decision." 93 The United States Supreme Court recognizes
states' rights to impose obligations and restrictions on professions
subject only to the "rational relation" test.94 The rational relation
test requires that a regulation must rationally relate to a legitimate
state end.95 The purpose of giving indigents effective representation
certainly is legitimate. Requiring attorneys to give the representa-
tion, as opposed to other groups, is certainly rational.96 Therefore, as
measured by the "'rational relation' test, the mandatory pro bono ob-
ligation would not deny equal protection of the laws to lawyers as a
group."97
Some suggest that a service requirement of attorneys would violate
the thirteenth amendment prohibition .of involuntary servitude.98
However, even opponents of mandatory pro bono admit that it is dif-
ficult to fashion a convincing argument using this constitutional ba-
sis.99 However, in In re Nine Applications,10 0 the court found the
appointment of uncompensated counsel created an unconstitutional
-relationship of involuntary servitude between attorney and client.10 1
Nevertheless, this decision flies in the face of the vast number of
courts holding that states may require uncompensated service to
meet public needs regardless of the thirteenth amendment.102
Several other points of unconstitutionality have been made with
what seems to be a "grasping for straws" approach to add bulk to ar-
guments. It has been suggested that "the burden of the requirement
[to represent the indigent by order] ... might be claimed to be so un-
fair as to amount to a denial of [the attorney's] substantive due pro-
cess." 03 This may be true in the occasional situation where the
amount of time and effort required by the attorney balloons beyond
that reasonably contemplated. However, such a denial of due process
93. Rosenfeld, supra note 81, at 294.
94. Id. at 295.
95. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
96. Rosenfeld, supra note 81, at 296. According to Rosenfeld, "that lawyers can
perform services to further [representation of the poor] 'better and more quickly than
others' is beyond dispute." Id.
97. Id.
98. The thirteenth amendment provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude ... shall exist within the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
99. Shapiro, supra note 81, at 770. "In the case of the lawyer, then, the imposition
of professional discipline, even to the point of disbarment, for refusal to accept an as-
signment appears to pass muster under the thirteenth amendment." Id.
100. 475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979). Nine plaintiffs in Title VII civil rights actions
were denied appointment of uncompensated counsel under section 2000e-5(f)(1) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the court found such appointments would violate the
thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude. Id.
101. Id. at 88. This.case is considered "the only decision that attempts to marshall
any analytical support for the involuntary servitude thesis." Rosenfeld, supra note 81,
at 291.
102. Torres & Stansky, supra note 80, at 1017 n.89.
103. Shapiro, supra note 81, at 770.
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is unlikely if a mandatory service program has both a specific time or
case number requirement, and proper safeguards are implemented to
assure the requirement is not inflated by unforeseen circumstances.
At the same time, one opponent of mandatory pro bono raises the
question whether the substantive due process of the indigent may be
violated by the appointment of counsel; he recognizes, however, the
argument has little force. 104
Finally, the fear is expressed that an attorney's right of associa-
tion1 05 may be violated by mandatory pro bono.106 The response to
this fear is the makeup of the mandatory pro bono program. Individ-
ual attorney's interests can be accommodated, while simultaneously
reducing the existing need of indigents to counsel, by giving the at-
torneys some say and involvement in the case(s) assigned them.
Proper procedures can see that this occurs.1 07
In spite of the clearly drawn battle lines over claims of constitu-
tionality versus unconstitutionality, perspective must be kept in fo-
cus. None of these arguments will ever be decided in a court of law
unless mandatory pro bono is adopted, implemented, and challenged.
Thus, the decision confronting bar associations whether or not to
pursue a mandatory service requirement should be decided on the ba-
sis of what needs exist, what practical impact the bar can have on
these needs, and whether the potential result justifies the effort.
Consideration of the constitutional issues is helpful to compose a pro-
gram that avoids arguments of invalidity; but, to refuse to implement
a mandatory service requirement because of potential constitutional
problems is inexcusable paralysis.10 8
B. The Practical Perspective
In addition to the constitutional arguments against mandatory pro
bono, opponents advance policy considerations that they say under-
mine the viability of a service requirement on attorneys.1 09 Several
104. Id. at 771 n.176. "There is not ... an adequate empirical basis for concluding
that the practice in some jurisdictions of assigning inadequately compensated counsel
so systematically violates the rights of criminal defendants to effective representation
under the sixth and fourteenth amendments as to be constitutionally defective on that
ground alone." Id.
105. The first amendment protects both the freedom to associate and privacy in
one's associations. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
106. Shapiro, supra note 81, at 763-67.
107. See in fra notes 158-175 and accompanying text.
108. Torres & Stansky, supra note 80, at 1022.
109. Gilbert & Gorenfeld, supra note 81, at 86-90; Shapiro, supra note 81, at 777-84.
1
of the arguments merit discussion as all of the potential problems
give rise to legitimate concerns; but a well-conceived service program
that is consistently applied can overcome these concerns.
The first argument is that the quality of services provided by attor-
neys in a mandatory service program would be low."l0 One critic has
said that requiring attorneys to provide free service to indigents
would "unwittingly be creating a form of second-class representa-
tion."'1 1 Lawyers, it is said, lack the experience and training neces-
sary to help the poor in their legal needs.112 No one could
realistically argue that an attorney specializing in international busi-
ness transactions or ERISA law (Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act) could comfortably aid an indigent in a housing eviction
suit without some form of training. However, experience in legal aid
offices suggests this objection is overstated."13 Certainly, training and
supervision would be necessary in any type of mandatory service pro-
gram. But the training component of the program could be reduced
in several ways.
First, by providing a "buy-out" provision which would enable an at-
torney to forego donating his service by making a financial contribu-
tion, as some mandatory pro bono programs do"14 and proposals
suggest,115 attorneys most lacking the skills would likely "buy-
out.""16 The "buy-out" effect would reduce the number of lawyers to
be trained while increasing the funds available."17 Second, by limit-
See also Uelmen, Simmering on the "Backburner": The Challenge of Yarbrough, 19
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 285, 308-17 (1985) (arguing that requiring attorneys to represent indi-
gent clients without compensation deprives the indigent of effective and conflict-free
representation).
110. Gilbert & Gorenfeld, supra note 81, at 89.
111. Id,
112. Id. at 87.
113. [M]any legal aid programs have found that, with relatively modest
amounts of training, even bond indenture lawyers can re-emerge from their
specialist shells. Much of the work done in legal services offices requires sub-
stantial experience as well as skill-just as in private lawyers' offices. But pri-
vate lawyers from a wide range of specialty backgrounds can be of immense
help in serving poor people.
Spencer, supra note 13, at 510 n.77 (citing Erhlich, Rationing Justice, 34 REC. 729, 744
(1979)).
114. Marin-Rosa & Stepter, supra note 75, at 22. Attorneys may satisfy their an-
nual service requirement by contributing $250 to the Orange County Legal Foundation
in Florida. Id.
115. See Chicago Resolution, supra note 73. Private attorneys in Chicago may sat-
isfy the voluntary pro bono service standards by contributing $365 or the net income of
25 hours of legal work to an organization promoting the legal interests of low income
persons. Id.; see also CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES COMMITTEE OF THE NORTH- DAKOTA
SUPREME COURT, DRAFT: A WORKABLE PLAN FOR CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR
AND NEAR POOR IN NORTH DAKOTA 56 (Nov. 1987) [hereinafter NORTH DAKOTA
DRAFT]. "A covered attorney may 'buy out' any shortfall of hours of service at an
hourly rate set by the Commission to meet the requirement." Id.
116. Spencer, supra note 13, at 510.
117. Id.
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ing the subject-matter of the law that compelled attorneys could face
to finite areas that hopefully are less complicated and time-consum-
ing, several benefits would result. The training program could be-
come more efficient as trainers with fewer, less complicated topics,
could specialize. Attorneys doing pro bono work in the same areas
would, over time, accumulate expertise requiring less training.1 8
Also, with the entire population of attorneys facing only certain areas
of law, assistance could be provided between attorneys independent
of the coordinating program, resulting in further resource savings.
This limiting of the law that pro bono attorneys would be responsible
for, would free full-time legal aid attorneys to concentrate on the
more complicated, time consuming areas.
Another argument is that even if attorneys have the skills needed
to represent the poor, they may intentionally lessen the quality of
services provided.119 One commentator has stated: "[T]here is a di-
rect relationship between level of compensation provided and quality
of services rendered to indigents."'120 Three responses neutralize this
objection. First, even though the representation is involuntary, the
relationship between attorney and client will still be governed by
principles such as those expressed in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.l21 Thus, the lawyer owes the indigent client the same com-
petence 122 and diligence123 that would exist for a paying client. Also,
those involved with legal aid firmly believe that attorneys' attitudes
may quickly change from resentment to compassion once they have
seen the needs of the poor.124 Finally, a requirement of a specific
118. Idc at 511.
119. Gilbert & Gorenfeld, supra note 81, at 88.
120. Uelmen, supra note 109, at 310.
121. Rules governing attorneys' efforts on behalf of a client make no distinction be-
tween high-paying, low-paying, or even non-paying clients. Rules of conduct refer only
to clients. See infra notes 122 and 123 and accompanying text.
122. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 71, Rule 1.1. "A lawyer shall provide competent rep-
resentation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Id.
123. Id. Rule 1.3. "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client." Id.
124. Eisenberg & Lardent, Pro Bono That Works, 37 NLADA BRIEFCASE 54 (1980).
There's nothing, I think, that can change private attorneys' attitudes.., more
quickly than representing a client who's living in substandard housing. ThbS
go out and take a look so they can represent the client in an eviction matter,
for example, and they see what it's like to live in a housing project or to spend
eighty percent of your disposable income ... for an apartment that is vermin-
infested, roach-ridden, hot in the summer, and cold in the winter.
Id,
amount of time125 instead of the completion of a certain number of
cases, could eliminate any shortcut incentive. If an attorney is re-
quired to complete two referral cases a year, a quick resolution is in
his best financial interest. Saving time, and thus money, might in-
duce him to take inappropriate shortcuts, such as settlements that
might not be in the client's best interests.126 However, with a re-
quirement stated in terms of twenty hours, an attorney has no incen-
tive to cut short particular cases. His requirement remains twenty
hours whether he assists two indigent clients or ten.
A second argument against mandatory pro bono is that, regardless
of the effort expended, the needs of the poor will not be met. Some
object that it would be "inefficient and paternalistic"127 to offer legal
services which, given their monetary value, the poor would prefer be
spent on other things.128 Granted, it is unlikely that the legal needs
of the poor would be fully satisfied by a nationwide requirement that
attorneys provide free assistance. However, "[t]he appropriate ques-
tion is whether mandatory public service will improve the situa-
tion."129  Nationwide in 1986, 580,480 active attorneys were not
involved in a pro bono program.130 If a mandatory pro bono require-
ment of only twenty hours per year was enacted and complied with,
almost 13.5 million attorney hours would be generated for the
poor.1 1 Using 2000 "billable" hours as an attorney-year, the
equivalent of more than 6700 attorneys would be put to work aiding
the indigent.13 2 This is a significant step in the right direction.
A third problem opponents point to is the adverse economic effects
attorneys and their indigent clients might suffer.'3 3 It is contended
that small firms and sole practitioners will suffer more extensively
than will large firms from a pro bono duty.13 4 The argument is that
the income to attorneys with small firms or in solo practice comes
125. The Boston, Chicago, and Connecticut resolutions regarding pro bono pro-
grams state the obligations owed in terms of hours, not cases. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
126. See Gilbert & Gorenfeld, supra note 81, at 88, 89.
127. Shapiro, supra note 81, at 779.
128. Humbach, Serving the Public Interest: An Overstated Objective, 65 A.B.A. J.
564, 566 (1979) ("Merely to increase substantially the quantity of free legal services is
largely to waste our time, if even the poor, given the value, would likely think it more
worthwhile to spend it on something else.").
129. Spencer, supra note 13, at 509.
130. 1987 ABA DIRECTORY, supra note 39, at 213, table no. 5.
131. The ABA estimated that there were 673,745 actively practicing attorneys in
December 1985. Id.
132. This estimate is on the conservative side, especially for services provided in the
future. Not only do several pro bono programs propose in excess of 20 hours per year
but the number of attorneys in the United States is projected to grow about 38% by
1994. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 14, at 384, table no. 656.
133. Humbach, supra note 128, at 566.
134. Id.
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from selling time. Thus, these attorneys could fulfill their duty only
by neglecting paying clients or by neglecting personal leisure time. 3 5
In response, one commentator notes that lawyers in large, urban
firms contribute less time totally and proportionally than attorneys
in solo practice, and thus they will be the ones required to signifi-
cantly increase their pro bono involvement. 36 Additionally, a re-
quirement of twenty hours a year is not so burdensome so as to make
the financial survival of an individual or small firm precarious. 3 7
Two suggestions for a mandatory pro bono program would elimi-
nate whatever rational fear of insolvency might exist. First, there
should be a "hard-luck" exception, by which only in a very limited
number of circumstances attorneys could be relieved of that year's
time requirement. 138 Although financial inconvenience would not
suffice, extreme financial difficulty should allow relief. 3 9 Second, to
alleviate what could be a greater burden on new attorneys who are
attempting to build a client-base, lawyers new to a community should
be relieved of the service requirements for two or three years. 40
Some practitioners believe, however, that taking advantage of exemp-
tions like the hard-luck or new attorney exceptions might actually be
financially counter-productive to an attorney.141
It is argued that the poor themselves may indirectly suffer econom-
ically due to an increase in pro bono work.142 This view, termed
"speculative" by one commentator, 43 develops out of the notion that
the civil suits of the poor are likely to be directed at persons or enti-
ties who provide them with services.144 Housing is a prime example;
since the landlord has experienced increased costs to his operation
135. Id.
136. Spencer, supra note 13, at 511.
137. Twenty hours would represent only one percent of the hours many large firms
require associates to bill annually. (This is based on the assumption that the average
attorney gives 2000 hours annually).
138. Luban, A Workable Plan for Mandatory Pro Bono, REPORT FROM THE CENTER
FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 11 (Winter 1985)
(suggesting a mandatory pro bono program is workable and outlining certain features
to ensure its success).
139. Id,
140. Id.
141. Markham, The Pros of Pro Bono, 2 THE COMPLEAT LAWYER No. 1, 23, 24 (1985)
(asserting that the benefits of doing pro bono work go beyond ethics and can improve
the financial bottom line by: 1) making contacts with court and law enforcement offi-
cials; 2) providing a network for referrals; and 3) broadening an attorneys legal educa-
tion and knowledge).
142. Humbach, supra note 128, at 566.
143. Spencer, supra note 13, at 511.
144. Humbach, supra note 128, at 566.
(in legal fees), he will likely raise rents to the detriment of the
poor.145
A fourth drawback of a mandatory pro bono program critics posit
is that it will increase the congestion of an already overburdened
court system.146 In addition to the obvious unfairness of placing the
onus of court overcrowding on a category of people who historically
have not been a factor in causing that problem, the argument over-
looks the fact that much of the public service work would occur in
non-court settings.147
A fifth objection to a required service program is that of vagueness.
How will attorneys know what types of service will be allowed and
how much time will be required of them?148 These questions appear
more significant than they actually are, especially when asked in the
absence of any program guidelines. Vagueness can be overcome by
clear, well-reasoned guidelines.149
Sixth, those disfavoring a required service program point to the ad-
ministrative problems such a plan would create. It is contended that
unacceptably high administrative costs would follow from the re-
quired training and coordinating efforts.150 Undoubtedly, increased
costs would be incurred. But according to one proponent, existing
projects have experienced successful coordination at reasonable cost,
and this particular criticism merely points out the benefit of a "buy-
out" option.'51
The final administrative problem deals with enforcement. Critics
contend that enforcement is impossible and would result in increas-
ing the public's disregard of the legal profession.15 2 Involving almost
700,000 attorneys153 in required service would certainly prove to en-
tail a large enforcement effort. But allowing the "buy-out" option,
requiring the work to be channeled through staffed coordinating or-
ganizations, 154 and reviewing annual reports submitted by attorneys
145. Id.
146. Shapiro, supra note 81, at 779.
147. Spencer, supra note 13, at 511.
148. Id. at 504-08.
149. For suggested guidelines that limit the range of types of service and quantify
the requirement due, see infra notes 173-188 and accompanying text.
150. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE LAWYER'S PRO BONO OBLIGATIONS, To-
WARD A MANDATORY CONTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SERVICE BY EVERY LAWYER 62, 63
(1980) [hereinafter NEW YORK REPORT]. This report recognizes the vast legal needs of
the poor and recommends a 30-50 hour per year mandatory obligation by all practicing
attorneys to engage in public service practice. It is appended with minority dissenting
views of individual committee members.
151. Spencer, supra note 13, at 512.
152. NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 150, at 62-63.
153. 1987 A.B.A. DIRECTORY, supra note 39, at 199, table no. 7.
154. See Marin-Rosa & Stepter, supra note 75, at 21. The Legal Aid Society of the
Orange County Bar Association acts as a referral mechanism to link indigent clients
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showing fulfillment of duties, 5 5 would minimize violations. 56 De-
spite the probable existence of enforcement shortcomings, the impact
of a mandatory pro bono program would far exceed the value of indi-
vidual, voluntary action. 157
In sum, many objections exist to the creation and enforcement of a
mandatory public service program for attorneys. Howeyer, none of
these criticisms, individually or collectively, overcomes the vast bene-
fit that such a program would produce.
V. MANDATORY PRO BONO: PROPOSALS FOR SUCCESS
The previous section discussed seven arguments against the practi-
cability of mandatory pro bono. As pointed out, those criticisms can
be neutralized by reasoning, past experience, and most importantly,
by the specific nature of the program adopted. This section suggests
the elements that will ensure the success of a required service pro-
gram for attorneys.
The model mandatory pro bono guidelines should contain four pro-
visions to overcome attorney opposition and to ensure that valuable
aid will be provided to the indigent. First, it must define what serv-
ices the program would require attorneys to provide. Second, the
program must specify the amount of commitment demanded of the
attorney. Third, the guidelines must delineate the exceptions that
would exempt an attorney from service. Fourth, a sunset provision
should be employed whereby the program would cease to exist after
a certain length of time unless readopted by a majority of the af-
fected attorneys.
A. Qualifying Service by Attorneys
The qualifying services under existing programs and proposals
span the gamut of possibilities. The proposal with the broadest view
with members of the Orange County Bar Association. Id; see also Chicago Resolution,
supra note 73, § 3. The resolution calls on the Chicago Bar Association to "make avail-
able or seek funding to employ a staff person to coordinate the [associations'] pro bono
activities." Id
155. Most proponents agree that a reporting requirement is necessary. Spencer,
supra note 13, at 512-13. The Kutak Commission originally proposed a reporting re-
quirement, which was deleted in response to pressure from members of the bhr. Slo-
nim, supra note 71, at 951.
156. Spencer, supra note 13, at 513.
157. Id. "To blithely attribute overwhelming significance to problems of enforce-
ment is more to demonstrate cynicism and distrust of one's professional peers than to
demonstrate administrative infeasibility." Id
of attorney efforts that would fulfill its mandatory requirements was
the Draft Rules promulgated by the Kutak Commission in 1980.158
Although this mandatory requirement was not adopted,159 the cur-
rent voluntary pro bono service standard enacted by the ABA contin-
ues to give great leeway to attorneys in deciding what activities can
be considered pro bono.160 An attorney may fulfill public interest
service by "providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee
to persons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups
or organizations, [or] by service in activities for improving the law,
the legal system or the legal profession."i61 The advantage of such a
broad guideline is that of providing discretion and creativity to the in-
dividual attorney to decide how he might best serve the public.
Nonetheless, this definition of qualifying service may be too broad.
One organization fears that wording this broad might reasonably in-
clude: supporting judicial candidates, holding public office, represent-
ing any "political, religious or lobbying group[s]" or even creating
social groups "ostensibly to 'improve the law.' "162
Another mandatory pro bono proposal was made in January 1980,
by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.163 This pro-
posal, compared to the ABA formulation, was slightly more restric-
tive in terms of what constituted public service work under the plan's
guidelines.164 First, to qualify efforts under the heading of the ad-
ministration of justice, an attorney would need to specifically direct
his work "towards improving and simplifying the legal process and
increasing the, availability and quality of legal services."16 5 Second,
legal services donated to institutions (charitable, religious, civic, gov-
ernmental, and educational) would qualify only "where the payment
of customary legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's
economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate."1 66 Unfor-
tunately, the New York proposal allows certain nonlegal efforts to
fulfill the attorney work requirement,16 7 and criminal as well as civil
158. DRAFT MODEL RULES, supra note 70, Rule 8.1.
159. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
160. MODEL RULES, supra note 72, Rule 6.1.
161. Id.
162. Eisenberg, NLADA on the ABA Model Rules, 37 NLADA BRIEFCASE 49 (1980)
(comments made to the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards).
163. NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 150.
164. Spencer, supra note 13, at 517.
165. NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 150, at 27.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 12-13. As a general rule, nonlegal functions are excluded in satisfying
the requirements, but two exceptions were provided: Nonlegal work designed to
carry-out or improve the administration of justice, and any services provided to an or-
ganization whose purpose is to provide pro bono legal services. Such a pro bono re-
quirement for attorneys should only be allowed to be fulfilled by work unique to
attorneys. In this way, the talents and abilities that attorneys possess, due to their pro-
fession, are best utilized for the poor. Id.
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casework is acceptable.16s
The National Legal Aid and Defense Association (NLADA) for-
warded a mandatory pro bono proposal in response to the Kutak
Commission's draft.169 This proposal is more narrow in scope, in
terms of service work allowed, than the Kutak Commission or New
York proposals. The NLADA plan allows an attorney to discharge
his public interest legal service duty in three ways:' 70
A lawyer shall render unpaid public interest legal service. A lawyer may dis-
charge this responsibility by service in activities for improving the availability
of legal services to persons or groups which have traditionally been denied
such services; or by providing professional services in civil cases to persons or,
organizations which lack sufficient funds to retain counsel; or by making a
cash contribution to an organization which engages in such activities. A law-
yer shall make an annual report concerning such service or payment to appro-
priate regulatory authority.
1 7 1
Unlike the three proposals just discussed, the mandatory pro bono
programs that currently exist 172 have simple guidelines by which at-
torneys can judge their activities to determine whether requirements
have been satisfied. To fulfill his annual responsibility in the local
programs, the attorney typically must take one or two pro bono re-
" ferrals. 173 Obviously, the beauty of these programs lies in their sim-
plicity. Attorneys know exactly where they stand in relation to what
is required of them. The drawback is that such a limitation may
dampen the creativity of attorneys to assist the legal needs of the
poor in ways other than casework. Another possible drawback of the
currently existing programs is that they allow a wide range of legal
problems of the poor to be referred to attorneys.174 If the number of
168. Id. at 27. Criminal defense work should not be a part of a mandatory pro bono
program as a constitutional duty exists for the government to provide counsel for the
accused. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Thus, the need of criminal litigants
to legal assistance has a solution provided. The need of civil litigants can begin to be
solved by mandatory pro bono limited to their assistance. See also Eisenberg, supra
note 162, at 49.
169. Eisenberg, supra note 162, at 49.
170. Id at 51.
171. Id. (emphasis in original); see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 75-79.
173. Marin-Rosa & Stepter, supra note 75, at 22. The services provided by the
Legal Aid Society of the Orange County Bar Association "include all legal problems
commonly experienced by poor persons, such as, consumer, landlord/tenant, adminis-
trative, family, juvenile and senior citizen situations." (emphasis added). See also Bitt-
ner Memorandum, supra note 77 (service statistics). The types of cases the
Tallahassee Legal Foundation take include: family law (divorce, separation, re-
straining orders, child support, alimony, custody, visitation, adoption, guardianship, pa-
ternity), employment problems, small claims defense, consumer complaints, property
disputes (including landlord/tenant), and social service administrative law.
174. The discretion of what types of cases are to be included in the mandatory ser-
legal subjects available for referral were reduced, a program could
experience several benefits.175
First, the resources expended in training would be reduced. Not
only would fewer specialists be required to instruct the attorneys on
the nuances of the various legal categories, but the instruction would
become more standardized. Common problems experienced by the
pro bono attorneys could quickly be incorporated into the instruction
syllabi. Attorneys would accumulate expertise in each year of ser-
vice, thus requiring little more in future training than information
pertaining to legal or procedural changes. Second, with more attor-
neys being instructed in fewer fields of indigent law, information and
assistance passing directly between attorneys would become practical,
and such bypassing of the coordinating office would conserve its re-
sources. Finally, the full-time legal aid attorneys would be freed to
concentrate on critical areas of the law that would be too complicated
to efficiently utilize the part-time resources generated by mandatory
pro bono.176
B. The Quantity of Service by Attorneys
The quantification requirement is framed by two basic approaches.
One, the existing local programs posit the quantification requirement
in terms of number of cases to be accepted and completed.177 This
approach has several advantages, one of which is continuity. The cli-
ent is benefited by having one counselor attending him throughout
his problem. This is also of benefit to the attorney if he is able to
quickly dispose of his client's legal need. Unfortunately, this ap-
vice program should be at the local administrative level. Those close to the situation
can make the most appropriate decisions of what cases to qualify based on the needs of
the poor in the community and the skills of the local attorneys. As a general rule,
however, family law matters primarily should be eligible for referral to the pro bono
attorneys. The first reason behind this rule is that a substantial percentage of the legal
problems of indigents are family law related. See Bittner Memorandum, supra note 77
(service statistics). According to the Tallahassee Legal Foundation, 73% of the cases
brought by indigents fall within the family law category. Second, unlike certain other
areas of the law where there exists a vested interest that is likely not indigent, land-
lord/tenant problems for instance, the parties do not have the desire to stretch out res-
olution of the determination of the legal claim. Third, in certain circumstances, the
law may be less complicated in family law matters.
175. Few law firms, and virtually no sole practitioners have the resources available
to solve some of the more complicated and intractable problems that face the poor.
However, for two inspiring examples of Los Angeles law firms willing to help the poor
despite enormous cost, see Krause, supra note 35, at 7. The law firm of Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher donated more than $500,000 in attorney time in a successful challenge to
horrendous living conditions in a slum apartment building. Id. The law firm of Irell
and Manella has contributed over 5000 hours to challenge health and safety conditions
of skid row motels where many homeless are housed. Id.
176. Marin.Rosa & Stepter, supra note 75, at 21. All members of the Orange
County Florida bar are required to accept two pro bono referrals annually. Id.
177. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 16: 355, 1989] Mandatory Pro Bono
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
proach may encourage attorneys to take shortcuts to reduce their ob-
ligations. 178 Such shortcuts might include efforts to settle a case
quickly, without proper discovery and investigation with which to
bolster an indigent client's bargaining position.179 This may result in
representation without justice for the client.
The second approach to the amount of service required is to mea-
sure it in hours expended. Most proposals and bar association aspira-
tional resolutions took this view. *80 This is probably the best
approach because the requirement is easy to quantify. Attorneys
know what is expected of them and are able to fit their obligation
more conveniently into their schedules. Where the legal needs of in-
digents are composed simply of questions or requests for advice, far
more indigents could be served in the hours approach.
In choosing the hours approach, the next question to confront is
how many hours should be required. Obviously, the more hours de-
manded, the more service provided for the indigents. However, the
fewer hours required, the less attorneys will object. The proposals
discussed have ranged from twenty-five to fifty hours per annum.'18
A twenty-hour yearly requirement may be far more practical. As
pointed out earlier, the impact of service provided in a twenty-hour
annual commitment by all attorneys would be substantial. 8 2 Equally
as important is the need to gain the attorneys' support, or at least to
decrease their wrath. An initial twenty-hour commitment is more
likely to be viewed as reasonable by the legal profession, especially in
light of past proposals.
A feature that would be valuable in a required service program
would be a "carry-over" provision. 8 3 This provision would allow an
attorney who has invested more of his time in pro bono than is re-
178. Id,
179. NEW YORK REPORT, aupra note 150, at 17-18. The New York proposal sug-
gested a required standard of 30-50 hours per year, rising to 50-70 hours as the program
acquired experience. Id. The Boston Bar Association suggested that a reasonable level
of commitment to pro bono is 35 hours per year at a minimum. Boston Resolution,
supra note 73. The Chicago Bar Association adopted a 25-hour per year standard. Chi-
cago Resolution, supra note 73. The Connecticut Bar Association set a standard of 25
hours per year in at least two civil referrals per year. Connecticut Resolution, supra
note 73.
180. Id.
181. See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
182. NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 150, at 20, 21. The New York proposal would
allow "carry forward" but only for a limited period into the future, not to exceed four
years.
183. Shapiro, supra note 81, at 782.
quired in year one to reduce his year two duty commensurately. For
example, if a mandatory pro bono system required twenty hours an-
nually and the attorney worked thirty hours in year one, he would
only be held to ten hours in year two. The advantage of this provi-
sion is that it enables an attorney to remain with a client longer than
the annual requirement demands, without penalty, as the need arises.
The final feature in the time requirement should be a "buy-out"
provision. This gives attorneys an alternative to the service work re-
quired. For whatever reason, they may make a financial contribution
in lieu of donating their time. Theoretically, there would be no loss
to the indigents, as the financial equivalent of the services would be
given to the pro bono program. 8 4 The additional funds generated
could certainly be put to use in providing the organizational frame-
work (training and referral coordination) for the pro bono program.
Better representation of the indigents may result because those who
would exercise the "buy-out" option would seem less likely to per-
form diligently. 8 5 Also, the number of attorneys to be trained would
decrease, saving both time and money. 86
The chief question here is how much should it cost to exercise this
"buy-out" option? The amounts contemplated by both existing and
proposed programs range from certain set amounts ($250)187 to the
equivalent of net income per billable hour in that locale multiplied
by the hours owed.188 Although administrative problems exist with a
"buy-out" provision measured in terms of the net income of billable
hours, 8 9 economically such a provision would ensure that the
equivalent of the obligation due would be donated, whether in service
or money.
C Recognized Exceptions
Flexibility is the hallmark of any successful program. Situations
will exist where to hold an attorney to the duty imposed on him by
the mandatory pro bono program would be unjust. In these narrow
categories of exceptions, attorneys should be made partly or wholly
exempt from the requirements. If an attorney is experiencing severe
personal problems, be they financial, physical, or emotional, the pro-
gram and the indigents, as well as the attorney would be best served
184. Id.
185. Spencer, supra note 13, at 510.
186. Matin-Rosa & Stepter, supra note 75, at 21.
187. Chicago Resolution, supra note 73.
188. A "buy-out" provision measured in terms of the monetary value of local billa-
ble hours would be more difficult to quantify and more difficult to administer than
would a set certain sum.
189. Luban, supra note 138, at 11 (suggesting exemption due to severe financial or
health problems).
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by an exemption.190 Another potential category consists of attorneys
just going into practice or new to the community. Because of the dif-
ficulties involved in "getting on your feet," such attorneys should be
given a two- or three-year grace period before the mandatory pro
bono duties inure to them.191
For practical matters, certain classes of members of the bar should
be exempted from mandatory pro bono service. Judges and legal aid
workers would fit into this category-the former to eliminate poten-
tial charges of conflict of interest, and the latter since they will be an
integral part of the coordination and distribution of the pro bono
services. To insure effectiveness, increase the beneficial impact, and
prevent charges of special treatment, the categories of exceptions to
mandatory pro bono must be narrowly drawn.
D. Sunset Provision
A serious criticism generally leveled at government programs, but
possibly appropriate to mandatory pro bono programs, is that once
created they tend to become self-perpetuating, even to the point that
regardless of whether the need or rationale that called for their es-
tablishment has ceased, the program continues. Although it is incon-
ceivable that the need of the indigents that calls out so demandingly
for mandatory pro bono will cease to exist in the foreseeable future,
the use of a sunset provision that would call for the modification or
termination of the program after a set period of time would lay to
rest attorneys' fears that once established it could not be terminated
even if ineffective or damaging. The use of sunset provisions with
mandatory pro bono programs is not an original concept. A provision
requiring that mandatory pro bono be terminated unless readopted
by a majority of practicing attorneys after five years would provide
safeguards for attorneys opposing mandatory pro bono, while at the
same time assuring a significant trial period by which to fully mea-
sure and test its efficacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The legal system in the United States is fast approaching a critical
juncture. While access to the resources of the legal system in this
country is becoming more and more a necessity to protect fundamen-
190. Id (suggesting five-year exemption for new attorneys).
191. NORTH DAKOTA DRAFr, supra note 115, at 60.
tal rights, the cost of that access is increasing. The result is that "jus-
tice for all" is a concept virtually devoid of reality for the indigent.
The legal profession, while not responsible for the plight of the
poor, has the opportunity to enhance the indigents' access to justice.
The most effective method available would be the adoption of a pub-
lic service requirement for all attorneys. Not only would significant
amounts of direct legal assistance to the poor be generated, but the
burden on the bar would be evenly spread among its members.
To embark on the path of mandatory pro bono will not be easy.
History has shown opposition will be fierce. But by properly educat-
ing attorneys to the needs of the poor, the commitment required of
the individual attorney, and the potential benefit of such service, the
necessary support for required public service may continue to grow.
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